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We develop an organizational governance model with a single buyer and endogenous upstream entry. Investments and control rights over assets and actions are immediately contractable; production is …
Discussion paper
We turn the zero-profit condition that is typically used to determine the number of firms into a game of entry/exit. We assume that identical firms compete in Cournot fashion, and when market …
Discussion paper
Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents …
Discussion paper
We build a simple formal model of governance. Investments and control rights over assets and labor are fully contractible, but final production decisions are ex ante uncontractible, and ex post …
Discussion paper
We theoretically investigate the effects of strategic pre-commitment in multilateral dynamic bargaining. Each round features a commitment stage in which players can declare that they will reject any …
Discussion paper
Chasing and the house money effect are well-known phenomena in dynamic environments of risky activities such as investment decisions or gambling. Recent studies suggest that such behavior emerges …
Discussion paper